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Weathering the Storm: Measuring Household Willingness-to-Pay  




The city of New Orleans suffered extensive damage as a result of Hurricane Katrina.  
Katrina overwhelmed the natural and built environment, inundating the city.   As 
rebuilding proceeds, decisions on investment in protective measures will include the 
choice of lines of defense and the storm severity that design criteria should meet.  An 
exhaustive list of protective measures has been studied in planning documents such as the 
Louisiana Coastal Protection and Restoration Technical Report (2009), with public 
comment solicited in town hall meetings.  In this study we employ a different approach to 
examine public sentiment towards the selection and investment in protective measures.  
Our study utilizes a stated choice experiment with a stratified sample to investigate 
individuals’ willingness-to-pay for rebuilding New Orleans’ man-made storm defenses, 
restoring natural storm protection, and improving evacuation options through a 
modernized transportation system.  We target residents of the New Orleans metropolitan 
area as well as other US citizens.  Our results indicate that individuals are willing-to-pay 
for increased storm protection for New Orleans, but the allocation of these resources 
differs among residents of the New Orleans metro area and other US citizens. 
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Hurricane Katrina made landfall on the Louisiana-Mississippi border of the Gulf 
Coast August 29th of 2005, leaving behind widespread devastation on the Alabama, 
Mississippi, and Louisiana coasts.  Although the eyewall of Katrina did not pass directly 
over New Orleans, wind driven waves and storm surge breached several points in the 
levee system, demonstrating that the city was ill equipped for a storm of Katrina’s 
magnitude.  Insufficient artificial and natural storm protection, in conjunction with New 
Orleans’ highly vulnerable physical and human geography, contributed to devastation 
throughout the city.   
  Media images of the disaster in New Orleans were burned in the social 
consciousness of the American public.  At the time of the storm, New Orleans was a city 
of immense poverty and racial inequality.
1  To make matters worse, many of New 
Orleans’ most vulnerable citizens lived in low lying areas most susceptible to flooding.  
Although evacuation orders had been made before Katrina’s landfall, many New Orleans 
residents were unable or unwilling to leave.  According to the 2000 US Census, 35% of 
African American households in New Orleans had no vehicle.  Government officials at 
the city, state, and federal levels had not only failed to protect New Orleans adequately 
from this type of event; they were also unprepared for the emergency management 
challenges leading up to the storm and in its aftermath.   The confluence of poor 
                                                 
1 According to the 2000 Census, 31% of African American families in New Orleans fell below the poverty 
line as compared to 5% of white families.  Also, according to 2005 U.S. Department of Housing and Urban 
Development estimates, 100% of public housing residents in New Orleans were African American.  Of 
these individuals, 29% had resided in public housing for between 10 to 20 years and 31% had resided in 
public housing for over 20 years. preparation and the vulnerability of the city and many of its people, led to one of the most 
costly natural disasters in U.S. history.   
  In the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina, the public has been forced to make difficult 
decisions concerning how to rebuild.  The geographic and social vulnerabilities of New 
Orleans contribute to the complexity of determining how government will allocate public 
funds for rebuilding.  There was an estimated $10 billion in damage to roads, bridges and 
the utility system in New Orleans alone.  In Orleans Parish, 134,344 housing units (71% 
of the housing stock) were damaged, making rebuilding no small feat.  New Orleans 
borders water on three sides, and much of the city lies below sea level, essentially 
creating a bowl between Lake Pontchartrain and the Mississippi River.  When the levees 
fail, as they did after Katrina, this bowl can fill up, leaving much of the city underwater. 
New Orleans relies heavily on a system of levees and pumps which hold back Lake 
Pontchartrain and the Mississippi River and remove water when it enters the bowl.
2  
Clear evidence of this vulnerability is the 27 major flooding disasters that have occurred 
in New Orleans over its roughly 300 year history (Kates, Colten, Laska, and Leatherman 
2006).  
During Katrina, over 80% of New Orleans was flooded, largely as a result of 
failed levees.  A preliminary analysis by the University of California at Berkeley and the 
American Society of Civil Engineers determined that these levees failed before they were 
overtopped, indicating design failure (Seed et al. 2006). The potential damage from a 
major hurricane had received considerable attention from the media and academics prior 
                                                 
2 The state’s levee system was founded in the Louisiana constitution, which created local levee and 
drainage districts to build and maintain levees.  Since Katrina, class action suits have been brought against 
the Orleans Levee District, the Lake Borgne Basin Levee district, the East Jefferson Levee District and 
their respective Boards of Commissioners and the US Army Corps of Engineers. to Katrina.
3  Unfortunately, there was insufficient political will to heed these warnings 
and protect the city in time.  The existing system did not perform up to its projected 
Category 3 storm-protection standard.   
There are a number of reasons as to why federal, state, and local governments 
failed to adequately fund levees and other flood protection measures.  The U.S. Army 
Corps of Engineers faced cost increases and design changes stemming from technical 
issues that limited their ability to fund new construction projects.  A Corps fact sheet 
from May 2005 stated that the appropriated funds for fiscal year 2005 were insufficient to 
cover new construction projects, including levee enlargement to enhance protection in the 
New Orleans Metropolitan area.  In addition, socio-political issues, including 
environmental concerns, legal challenges, and local opposition to some aspects of the 
flood management plan, complicated initiation and completion of some projects (US 
GAO 2005).  The contentious environment surrounding levee maintenance and 
augmentation combined with the high price tag limited initiative to address flood hazard 
in New Orleans, not only for President Bush, but also previous administrations.  
Kunreuther and Pauly (2006) refer to this phenomenon as the not in my term of office 
(NIMTO) syndrome.   
Aside from man-made structures, natural coastal features such as wetlands and 
barrier islands provide additional storm protection for coastal regions.  Previous estimates 
from Hurricane Andrew suggest that a linear kilometer of coastal marsh can reduce storm 
surge by roughly 7.9 cm (Lovelace 1994).  While flooding from Katrina was largely the 
                                                 
3 Between June 23-27, 2005 the New Orleans Times-Picayune ran a series entitled “Washing Away” that 
was critical of federal, state, and local government flood risk management in south Louisiana.  The 
vulnerability of New Orleans was also mentioned in the US Commission for Ocean Policy, as well as in a 
Scientific American piece titled “Drowning New Orleans” (Fischetti 2001). result of failed levees, degraded coastal wetlands played a significant role in the disaster.  
Louisiana has experienced significant losses of coastal wetlands, stemming from 
individual and government actions at various levels within the Mississippi River basin.  
Kousky and Zeckhauser (2006) term spatial externalities associated with losses in 
ecosystem services as JARing actions (Jeopardized Assets that are Remote).  The 
construction of levees, dams, and canals in the Mississippi River basin since the 19
th 
century has significantly changed sediment transport in the system.  Alterations in 
sediment transport have starved wetlands (Turner 1999).  In addition, land subsidence 
(either natural or due to hydrocarbon extraction) and rising sea levels threaten low lying 
coastal areas (Morton et al.  2002).  Decreased sediment flow and resource extraction 
have imposed external costs on New Orleans and other Gulf coast cities in the form of a 
degraded natural environment and reduced storm protection.   
Kousky and Zeckhauser (2006) attribute the challenges of addressing JARing 
actions to the difficulties associated with assigning responsibility, as well as the large 
number of injured and injuring parties.  In the case of post-Katrina New Orleans, reduced 
storm defenses were the result of a combination of choices made by businesses and 
residents across the Mississippi River basin as well as the federal government over many 
decades.  Ironically, many of the initiatives that ultimately degraded Louisiana’s coastal 
marshes were designed to reduce flood risk.  Development levees reduce the risk of river 
flooding by keeping rising waters in the river channel.  By prohibiting river flooding, 
however, coastal marshes are deprived of sediment and become degraded, ultimately 
raising the risk of storm surge and flooding.  Many of these type of flood reduction 
efforts were undertaken by parties throughout the Mississippi River basin with little awareness or regard to the potential impacts on coastal marshes and individuals 
downstream.  The externalities of river channelization thus occur at a broad spatial scale 
and can involve significant time lags.  
In addition to natural and man-made flood protection, transit and highway 
infrastructure play a key role in evaluating the vulnerability of coastal populations.  The 
capacity and resilience of transit and highway infrastructure affect how successfully 
transit can be used in emergency evacuation and disaster response.  In a special report, 
the Transportation Research Board recommended that “Federal funding should be 
provided for the development of regional evacuation plans that include transit and other 
public transportation providers.”   Further, public transit fills a unique role in providing a 
mode of evacuation for populations that are transit-dependent and may require special 
assistance.  In spite of this, current evacuation plans do not fully reflect this important 
role. 
Public transportation serves populations with relatively high proportions of racial 
and ethnic minorities, persons with low incomes, persons with limited English 
proficiency and persons living in households without vehicles.  In a report commissioned 
by the Federal Transit Administration’s Office of Civil Rights, it was concluded that in 
20 metropolitan regions under study, “with some exceptions, the agencies reviewed in 
this study have taken limited steps towards involving populations with specific mobility 
needs in emergency preparedness, planning … or coordinating with other agencies to 
meet the specific needs of these populations in an emergency.” 
The Louisiana Coastal Protection and Restoration Plan (LACPR, 2009) and 
Mississippi Coastal Improvements Program (MsCIP, 2009) were created in response to a U.S. Congressional directive to develop plans for hurricane risk reduction and coastal 
restoration.  The LACPR Plan Formulation Atlas considered measures that could be 
combined to form an exhaustive 200 million restoration and protection policy 
alternatives.  The final technical report presents four to six alternatives for each of five 
planning units – hurricane and storm surge resistant levees, protective coastal landscapes, 
livable communities, cultural resources, and level of storm and flood risk.   Our study 
investigates a general and limited set of options.  We examine individuals’ willingness-
to-pay to reduce flood risk in New Orleans through application of a stated choice 
experiment.   In so doing we offer a different perspective to LACPR in a fairly simple 
framework.  We provide a measure of the public will (both national and local) to protect 
human and physical capital in this vulnerable location.  The choice experiment focuses on 
hypothetical projects which propose lines of defense in the form of coastal restoration 
and Category 5 levees, as well as modernizing existing transportation networks in New 
Orleans.  Through the application of a stratified sampling procedure, we investigate 
rebuilding preferences for individuals in the New Orleans metropolitan area and U.S. tax 
payers in general.   
Our results suggest that levee flood protection designed to withstand a category 5 
storm is the most salient rebuilding feature.  New Orleans metro area residents are willing 
to pay $301 per household for category 5 levee protection, while the average U.S. 
household is willing to pay more, an estimated $509.   We speculate that this difference 
could reflect higher average income for the U.S. population relative to New Orleans 
residents, assuming flood protection is a normal good.  Results of the combined model indicate an average willingness-to-pay (WTP) of $449 per U.S. household for upgrading 
New Orleans levee system to withstand a Category 5 storm.   
Surprisingly, WTP for coastal restoration was not statistically significant for the 
New Orleans or U.S. samples, but the combined model indicates an overall average 
economic value of $103 per household.  We find evidence of significant variability in the 
utility attributable to coastal restoration across the U.S. and combined samples.  A latent 
class model reveals that individuals that view coastal restoration as an important part of 
rebuilding New Orleans and have higher income are willing to pay $214 for coastal 
restoration, while those that do not see coastal restoration as important and have lower 
income are not willing to pay.   
New Orleans metro area residents are willing to pay an estimated $137 per 
household for modernized transportation in the New Orleans metro area, while the 
average U.S. household is not willing to pay for this.  Again, the latent class model 
reveals some differences in economic value across groups, with higher income U.S. 
households that view coastal restoration as important harboring a negative WTP for 
improvements in transportation.  We speculate that this reflects a concern that improved 
infrastructure will encourage additional development in hazard prone areas like New 
Orleans.  Nonetheless, results of the combined model indicate an average WTP of $103 
per U.S. household for modernizing New Orleans’ transportation infrastructure. 
 
Preferences for Rebuilding New Orleans 
  The main purpose of this paper is to evaluate individual preferences for the 
reconstruction of New Orleans.  The rebuilding plans constitute a series of local public goods; we estimate individual willingness to pay for these public goods.  Since many 
decisions have yet to be made on restoring New Orleans, we employ hypothetical choice 
experiments (CE) to assess preferences for rebuilding.  CE are a stated preference method 
that can be used to value the characteristics of rebuilding projects.  In a CE, subjects are 
asked to express a preference over several alternatives.  The alternatives vary in the levels 
of attributes offered, and can include a status quo or “no choice” option.  The attributes 
associated with each option and their levels are chosen by the researcher to address the 
valuation question at hand.  By observing respondents’ choices over a number of choice 
sets, we can learn about the tradeoffs individuals are willing to make in terms of a 
rebuilding plan for New Orleans. 
Our principal sample is composed of New Orleans metropolitan area households 
– the primary beneficiaries of rebuilding efforts.  We employ a random digit dialing 
survey that utilizes paired comparisons – status quo rebuilding plan versus an alternative 
that can exhibit improvements in flood control, coastal restoration, and/or transportation 
infrastructure.  The paired comparison approach was deemed necessary because visual 
aids were difficult to employ with a telephone survey.  By focusing on status quo versus 
an alternative in each choice set, we minimize the amount of information that respondents 
must process, as the status quo was constant across all choice sets.  We utilize an 
experimental design that allows us to maximize statistical performance while maintaining 
task simplicity.  In addition to the New Orleans subjects, we also gathered choice data 
from a sample of U.S. households. 
 
Experimental Design   Our choice experiment investigates rebuilding options using four primary 
attributes: i) levee augmentation, ii) coastal restoration, iii) transportation system 
improvements, and iv) a funding mechanism in the form of a one-time increase in federal 
income tax payments.  As indicated in table 1, each program attribute has two levels, 
while the tax attribute has four levels.  The initial level of each program attribute is 
described as the status quo level in order to facilitate the pair wise choice design.  Similar 
to previous work in the environmental literature (Adamowicz et al. 1994, 1998; Layton 
and Brown 2000; McGonagle and Swallow 2005; Ladenburg and Olsen 2008), the choice 
experiment focuses on preferences for public goods – in our case, this is rebuilding or 
improving public works – rather than preferences for private goods, such as funds for 
rebuilding private property (which would primarily benefit individual households and 
businesses).  We focus on public projects which decrease existing vulnerabilities (levee 
augmentation and coastal restoration) or enhance evacuation possibilities (improvements 
in transportation infrastructure).  Examples of conjoint choice sets can be found in section 
B of the Appendix. 
  Respondents were given a choice between two levels of flood protection.  The 
status quo option was to ensure that all levees were capable of withstanding the wind, 
waves, and storm surge that would accompany a Category 3 storm.   The alternative 
option would fortify all levees to be capable of withstanding the wind, wave action, and 
storm surge consistent with a Category 5 hurricane.  By congressional mandate, the 
LACPR offers multiple planning options capable of providing this level of protection.  As 
such, we chose to focus on this level of storm protection, which will provide a sense of 
the magnitude of the maximum benefits that storm protection could provide.  This estimate would be an upper bound on other levels of storm protection, all else being 
equal. 
The choice sets include an option for restoration of Louisiana’s coastal wetlands.  
The status quo option is no coastal restoration, and the alternative is to invest in restoring 
coastal wetlands.  Improvements in coastal wetlands would provide additional protection 
against hurricane force winds and storm surge.  In addition, restoring coastal wetlands 
would provide for additional environmental benefits, such as fisheries habitat and other 
ecosystem services.  These additional benefits were not noted in the survey, but we 
suspect that many coastal residents are aware of these additional benefits. 
The survey also asked respondents to consider improvements in New Orleans’ 
transportation infrastructure.  The status quo option entails limited bus service, street 
cars, and conventional roads.  The alternative is modernized transportation infrastructure 
that includes expanded bus and light rail (e.g. street car) service and improved road 
networks.  The modernized transportation system would provide for improved transit 
through the city on a day-to-day basis and would enhance the ability of citizens to 
evacuate in the event of a hurricane. 
The payment vehicle was a compulsory, one-time increase in federal income tax 
payments for all U.S. households.  The status quo was provided at zero additional cost, 
while the tax payment associated with the alternative varied at $50, $150, $300, or $450 
per household.   The survey explicitly states that all money raised by this one-time tax 
would go directly to rebuilding projects in New Orleans and restoration projects in 
coastal Louisiana.   Hypothetical bias is a potential limitation of our CE research method. This bias 
can arise within a stated preference framework due to the hypothetical nature of the 
exercise; lacking real incentives for choice, subjects may not be sufficiently motivated to 
expend cognitive effort to search their preferences.  Evidence of hypothetical bias in CE 
is mixed (Carlsson and Martinsson 2001; Lusk and Schroeder 2004; Johansson-Stenman 
and Svedsäter 2008).  Lusk and Schroeder (2004) find suggestive evidence that CE are 
capable of producing unbiased estimates of marginal willingness-to-pay (WTP), while 
there may be bias in estimation of total WTP.  There is some evidence that hypothetical 
bias can be attenuated through application of a “cheap talk” script, which focuses 
respondent attention on the phenomenon of  bias and encourages them to respond as if 
the exercise were real (Carlsson, Frykblom and Lagerkvist 2005; List, Sinha, and Taylor 
2006).  We, thus, employ a variant of cheap talk that is similar to the original language in 
Cummings and Taylor (1999), but shortened to fit within the context of a telephone 
survey and changed to reflect differences in the nature of the good being valued.  The 
cheap talk script is included in section A of the Appendix. 
With our proposed attributes, a full factorial design has 32 choice sets; fully 
efficient designs for linear models can be constructed with 8 or 16 choice sets.  We chose 
16 choice sets, which represents a fractional factorial design from which main effects can 
be estimated.  The choice of a fractional factorial design partly reflects the fact that there 
were dominated options in the full factorial (e.g., status quo conditions at zero vs. 
positive price); we did not allow for dominated options.  We follow Huber and Zwerina 
(1996) in constructing a linear experimental design that is orthogonal (levels of each 
attribute vary independently of one another) and balanced (levels of each attribute appear with equal frequency), and one for which overlap of attributes within each choice set is 
minimized and utility is balanced so that expected probabilities are equal across choices.  
We employ SAS Macros %MktEx and %ChoiceEff to design a fully efficient (100% A 
and D efficiency for a linear model) fractional factorial design of 16 pair wise choice sets 
(Kuhfeld 2005).  In all choice sets, the status quo is offered against an alternative plan 
that has at least one improvement in program attributes.   
As our econometric model is non-linear, however, we cannot claim that our 
design is in fact fully efficient (which would require advance knowledge of unknown 
parameters).  Huber and Zwerina (1996) claim that using linear designs for choice 
experiments is a reasonable approach in situations for which no prior knowledge of 
parameter estimates is available.  In order to lessen the burden on subjects, we utilize a 
blocked design of the 16 choice sets, employing four choice sets per respondent.  The 
%MktBlock SAS Macro was used to efficiently partition our 16 choice sets into 4 blocks 
of 4 choice sets.  An example of one of the blocks is included in section B of the 
Appendix.  The sequencing of the choice sets within each block was alternated across 
respondents in order to control for order effects, producing a total of 16 choice sets – 4 
blocks of 4 choice sets with 4 sequences. 
 
Survey Questionnaire and Administration 
  Our survey targeted two populations, residents of the New Orleans Metropolitan 
Statistical Area (MSA) and U.S. residents not in the New Orleans MSA.  Each survey 
had three primary sections, and we estimated it would take between 10 and 15 minutes to 
administer.  The first section of the New Orleans survey elicits information concerning the respondent’s family attachment to New Orleans, whether the respondent experienced 
Hurricane Katrina, and whether this event and the aftermath would influence their 
decision to stay in the area.  The first section includes a series of Likert-scale questions 
designed to assess the subjects’ perceptions of various attributes of the rebuilding plan, 
including the importance of crime control, housing availability, job creation, flood 
protection, coastal wetland restoration, improved transportation, and cultural 
preservation.  For the U.S. survey, the first section gauges individuals’ familiarity and 
experience with New Orleans, in addition to the assessment of perceptions of the 
importance of rebuilding factors.   
The second section of the survey administers the choice experiment.  Our blocked 
experimental design offered four choices to each respondent, with subjects choosing 
either the status quo at $0 additional federal taxes per household or an alternative 
scenario that offers improvements in the rebuilding plan for one-time payment of 
additional federal taxes for each U.S. household.  Subjects were instructed to treat each 
choice set as if it were an independent referendum that should be considered in isolation 
from the other choices.  In each survey, we precede the four hypothetical choices with a 
cheap-talk script (see section A of the Appendix).  The third part of the survey elicits 
information on socio-demographic factors, including gender, ethnicity, whether the 
respondent considers her/himself Latino or Cajun, level of education, employment status, 
age, income and household size.   
 
Data Our sample was collected via a stratified random digit dial of telephone numbers 
in the New Orleans MSA and other U.S. households.  The survey was administered 
between May 2007 and June 2008 by individuals in East Carolina University’s Sociology 
Research Lab.  Successful contact rates were low for the New Orleans MSA; this likely 
reflects displaced households.  The final dataset includes information from 128 
households in the New Orleans MSA and 220 U.S. households not in the New Orleans 
vicinity; the corresponding raw response rates are 128/500 = 25.6% and 220/500 = 44%, 
respectively.  Once contact was established with the household, however, the cooperation 
rates were 43% for the New Orleans MSA and 62% the U.S.    Due to incomplete 
information, only 120 households in the New Orleans MSA and 217 U.S. households not 
in the New Orleans vicinity are used in the choice models. 
In an effort to address potential response bias, we develop a weighting scheme to 
adjust data to match characteristics from the 2006 American Community Survey (U.S. 
Census Bureau).  Our inverse probability weights are based on observable demographic 
factors - gender, race, Latino status, education level, marital status, and income.  Table 2 
depicts the weighted and un-weighted descriptive statistics for the New Orleans and U.S. 
strata.  We estimate choice models for both strata, and combine the strata in order to 
estimate a single model, applying weights so that the results reflect observable population 
characteristics.  
  The average New Orleans respondent had been living in the metropolitan area 41 
years, and 76% of households contacted have at least one set of parents from the New 
Orleans area.  Eighty-one percent were in New Orleans when Hurricane Katrina struck.  
Thirty-two percent of households have considered leaving New Orleans in the wake of the disaster, with 22% indicating they are very likely or somewhat likely to leave.  About 
seven percent of U.S. respondents indicated that they have visited New Orleans, and 15 
percent responded that they either visit on a regular basis or plan to visit in the future.  
Eleven percent of U.S. respondents indicated that they have friends or family in the New 
Orleans area. 
Tables 3-5 report results on individual perceptions of the importance of various 
factors in the rebuilding plan for the New Orleans and U.S. samples in the form of a 
weighted frequency table.  Our results indicate that individuals in both samples believe 
that flood protection is very important, but a higher proportion of individuals in the New 




We utilize the Random Utility Model (RUM) as a theoretical basis for our choice 
experiment.  We assume that individuals choose rebuilding projects for New Orleans 
which yield the highest level of utility.  Individual n’s utility associated with a choice i in 
choice set t, denoted  , is a function of project characteristics, xnit, and associated cost, 
cnit.  Utility can be decomposed into an observable portion,  , and an 
unobservable portion known only by the subject, 
nit U
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* are unknown parameters to be estimated.  The probability of individual n 
choosing a project i over other choice j in set t, is thus: 
] ) , ; , ( ) , ; , ( Pr[
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njt njt njt njt nit nit nit nit nit x c V x c V P ε β α ε β α + ≥ + = .   [2] We assume the observable portion of utility is additive: 
.  Under the assumption that the error terms in [2],  nit nit nit nit nit x c x c V
* * * * ) , ; , ( β α β α + =
nit ε , are i.i.d. extreme value variates for all n, i, and t, the choice probabilities take the 
closed-form expression:  















,        [ 3 ]  
Under this pooled logit formulation, the multinomial logit (MNL) model can be used to 
estimate the normalized unknown parameters,   and  , where σ is the 
scale parameter of the extreme value distribution.  It is widely recognized, however, that 
MNL incorporates taste variation in a potentially restrictive manner, limits substitution 
patterns, and does not allow for correlation across repeated individual choices.  Thus, in 
our application of RUM, we employ the repeated mixed logit (RXL)  model (Herriges 
and Phaneuf 2002; Train 1999) and the latent class (LC)  or finite mixture model (Boxall 
and Adamowicz 2002; Train 1999), each of which incorporates unobserved individual 
heterogeneity by allowing the α and/or β parameters to vary within the sample.  The 
variability of utility parameters incorporates taste heterogeneity, provides for more 
complex substitution patterns, and allows correlation across individual choices.   
σ α α /
* = σ β β /
* =
For the RXL model, the  nit ε  are i.i.d. extreme value variates for all n, i, and t, and 
the choice probabilities for any period t are conditional on an individual-specific vector 
βn.  Including an alternative specific constant for the status quo, the conditional choice 
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where dnjt = 1 for status quo, zero otherwise.  We assume  ) , | ( ~ Ω μ β φ β , where φ is a 
multivariate normal probability density with mean µ and covariance matrix Ω.  Since our 
experiment is designed to estimate main effects, we restrict Ω to be diagonal; covariance 
parameters would only be identified based on functional form.  Since  nit ε  are i.i.d. for all 
t, the conditional probabilities for a series of choices i = {i1,…iT } is given by the product 
of [4] across choice occasions: 
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Under the formulation of RXL, the unconditional choice probabilities are: 
β μ β φ β α ψ d P P n n ) , | ( ) , , ( Ω =∫
i i (
       [ 6 ]  
The likelihood function is the product of [6] over all individuals in the sample.  The 
means of the ψ and α parameters, as well as the means and variance terms for β are 
recovered from Simulated Maximum Likelihood estimates.   
The LC model differs from the RXL in that it incorporates unobserved individual 
heterogeneity through the use of discrete rather than continuous mixing distributions.  In 
this model, it is hypothesized that individual specific characteristics ( ) sort individuals 
into K groups.  Each group potentially has different preferences over project choices, so 
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 ∀ k.      [ 7 ]  Since the unobserved errors are i.i.d. extreme value across t, the conditional probabilities 
for a series of choices i = {i1,…iT } by type k is given by the product of [7] across choice 
occasions: 
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Group membership is unknown to the researcher.  The conditional choice probabilities in 
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where the vector sn contains demographic variables that influence class membership 
according to unknown parameters .  Identification requires that parameters for one 
are normalized to zero.  The unconditional probability for a series of choices by 
individual n is obtained by a weighted sum of [8] over the k groups, where the weights 
are given by [9]:  
k δ
K k ∈
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The parameters of model [10] are estimated by maximum likelihood. 
We use compensating variation (CV) to measure the incremental welfare change, 
also known as marginal willingness to pay (MWTP), associated with program attributes 











CV ,         [ 1 1 ]  
 for each element of the vector x.  Given the discrete nature of program attributes, ∆x = 1.  
For the RXL model, equation [11] is simulated for all n respondents by taking R draws 
from the posterior distribution of β, calculating CV and averaging across the R 
calculations.  For the LC model, equation [11] is calculated for each of the k segments 
(replacing βn with β
k).  Mean CV can be calculated as the weighted average across 
segments, where the weights are given by [9].  The Krinksy-Robb procedure (1986) is 
used to produce standard errors of CV.  Krinsky-Robb is a parametric bootstrap method 
which takes random draws from the multivariate normal distribution of parameters 
utilizing information from the vector of estimated parameters and the variance-covariance 
matrix.  In our application we take 10,000 random draws in order to develop both 90% 
and 95% confidence intervals of MWTP.   
 
Results  
The random utility models (RUMs) are estimated using Matlab and NLOGIT 
(Greene 2007).
4  We estimate three models using the RXL estimator, corresponding with 
New Orleans, U.S., and combined datasets.  Each model includes dummy variables for 
projects with category 5 levees, coastal restoration, and modernized transportation 
system.  For the U.S. and combined models, all of these parameters are assumed to be 
drawn from a normal distribution with diagonal covariance matrix.  For the New Orleans 
sample, the coefficient for the Category 5 levee and modernized transportation are 
assumed fixed; estimated standard deviations for these parameters under the assumption 
                                                 
4 The Mixed Logit was estimated using code written by H. Allen Klaiber for the “Micro-Econometrics In 
and Out of Markets: A Second Training Workshop on Micro-Econometrics in Environmental Economics.”  
This workshop was developed and funded by the Center for Environmental and Resource Economic Policy 
(CEnREP) at North Carolina State University and the US Environmental Protection Agency. of normality were not statistically significant.
5  The coefficients for the alternative 
specific constant representing the status quo option and the tax variable are assumed 
fixed.  Models were estimated using Maximum Simulated Likelihood based on 1000 
Halton draws.
6  Table 6 presents the parameter estimates for RXL choice models.  
  In each of the three models, the constant representing the status quo is not 
statistically significant.  As anticipated, the coefficient on the one-time tax increase is 
negative and statistically significant at 0.1 % chance of a type I error in each model.  For 
each model, the coefficient representing category 5 levees is positive, implying that 
individuals prefer projects that implement the maximum level of storm protection.  Each 
coefficient representing category 5 levee protection is statistically significant at the 1 % 
level.  Among project attributes, category 5 levee protection has the largest coefficient, 
indicating that the average individual believes this project attribute is important relative 
to other program attributes.  Under the assumption of normality, the standard deviation 
for this coefficient suggests that most individuals exhibit positive preferences for this 
attribute, but significant preference heterogeneity does exist for U.S. and combined 
models.   
In allowing for a random parameter for coastal restoration, the standard deviation 
was found to be statistically insignificant for the New Orleans model.  Employing a fixed 
coefficient, the mean utility effect for coastal restoration in the New Orleans models is 
statistically significant (at the 10 % level), and we estimate a positive parameter.  Results 
for U.S. and combined models suggest that utility values for coastal restoration 
encompass both negative and positive values.  The mean coefficient for coastal 
                                                 
5 A likelihood ratio test supports this restriction. 
6 See Train (2003) for a discussion of utilizing Halton sequences to draw from densities in mixed logit 
models.   restoration is not statistically significant in these models, but the standard deviations are 
statistically significant at the 1 % level.  We interpret these results as indicating that some 
individuals in the broader population value coastal restoration while others perceive it as 
something that should not be funded through general taxation. 
The coefficient for modern transportation is positive in each model, but 
statistically significant only for the New Orleans (5 % level) and combined (10 % level) 
estimates.  As variability in the random parameter was not statistically significant, the 
New Orleans model is estimated with a fixed parameter.  The estimated mean effects for 
New Orleans and combined are positive, as expected.  In the Combined and U.S. samples 
the standard deviations for the distribution of coefficients for modern transportation are 
statistically significant at the 10 % and 5 % level, respectively.  Much like coastal 
restoration, results from the combined and U.S. samples indicate that some individuals 
favor rebuilding projects with modernized transportation while others favor projects 
without it. 
  In an effort to investigate determinants of preference heterogeneity within our 
samples, we also estimated LC models for both the New Orleans and U.S. samples.  
While these efforts were inconclusive for the New Orleans sample, the approach did 
reveal potential sources of variation in preferences among U.S. residents.  We focus on a 
similar specification for the LC model, with a status quo alternative-specific constant, a 
project tax or cost variable, and indicator variables for category 5 levees, coastal 
restoration, and modernized transportation systems.  Socio-demographic variables 
defining the finite mixture probabilities are comprised of household income and the likert scale response indicating the importance of coastal wetland restoration.  Table 7 presents 
the results of the latent class model for the U.S. sample.
7  
  For the LC model, respondents are endogenously divided into K = 2 groups, with 
posterior probabilities suggesting that roughly 35% of the sample falls into the first group 
and the remaining 65% in the second group.  The class membership probability 
parameters indicate that the first group views coastal wetland restoration as less important 
than the second group.  The negative sign on the income variable also indicates that the 
first group is represented by lower income households.  The status quo variable is 
positive and statistically significant for group 1, indicating that individuals with less 
concern over coastal restoration and lower income are more likely to vote for no 
improvements in the rebuilding plan for New Orleans.  For each group, the coefficient for 
category 5 levees is positive and statistically significant at the 1 % level, implying that 
individuals in both groups prefer projects that employ the maximum level of storm 
protection.  Individuals in the second group respond positively to projects that include 
coastal restoration, while choices in the first group were not affected by coastal 
restoration.  The coefficient for modern transportation was positive for both groups, but 
not statistically significant.  Lastly, the coefficient on tax is negative and statistically 
significant at the 1 % level for each group, as expected.  The negative impact of cost, 
however, is four times larger for those in the first group.  
 Table  8 presents marginal willingness-to-pay (MWTP) estimates for rebuilding 
attributes which mitigate future risks to New Orleans and its citizens.  Figures 1 – 3 
depict the confidence intervals of MWTP for rebuilding attributes in the different 
samples.  Our estimates indicate that the average individual in the New Orleans sample is 
                                                 
7 Results for the Combined model are very similar. willing to pay $301 for category 5 levee protection versus $509 for the average individual 
in the U.S. sample.  The average individual in the combined sample is willing-to-pay 
$449 for category 5 levees.  The confidence intervals, estimated with the Krinsky-Robb 
procedure, indicate that all welfare estimates for Category 5 levee protection are 
statistically significant at the 1 % level.  The latent class model allows us to examine 
welfare estimates for discrete groups of U.S. residents.  The first group, identified as 
likely to include individuals that view coastal restoration as less important in the 
rebuilding plan and individuals with lower income, is associated with a willingness to pay 
of $433 for category 5 levees.   An average individual from the second group (counterpart 
to the first group) is willing to pay $514 for category 5 levees.  The difference between 
these two welfare estimates for the LC model is not statistically significant.  As indicated 
in figure 1, all estimates (except New Orleans) exhibit significant overlap and similar 
central tendancies. 
Turning to coastal restoration values, we do not obtain statistically significant 
measures of MWTP for the New Orleans and U.S. samples for the RXL model.  In the 
former case, this result likely reflects the low level of significance for the fixed coastal 
restoration parameter, while in the latter it reflects wide variability in this random 
parameter.   The average individual in the combined model is willing to pay $103 for 
coastal restoration, and this estimate is significant at the 5 % level.  Estimates from the 
LC model indicate an average individual from the second group in the U.S. sample is 
willing to pay $214 for coastal restoration.  Figure 2 indicates that only the estimates 
associated with the combined RXL model and group 2 for the LC model have 
distributions with sufficient mass above zero. Lastly, we find that the average individual in the New Orleans sample is willing 
to pay $137 for modernized transportation (significant at the 10 % level), while MWTP 
for the U.S. sample is not statistically significant in the RXL results.  Households in the 
combined sample are willing to pay $103 for modernized transportation (significant at the 
10 % level).  With the LC model, MWTP is positive but insignificant for group one, but 
negative and statistically significant for group two!  The average person in group 2 – 
more likely to include higher income households and individuals that view coastal 
restoration as important – has a negative MWTP value of -$93.45 (significant at the 5 % 
level).  These distributions of MWTP are depicted in figure 3. 
 
Discussion and Conclusions 
Following the extensive devastation unleashed by Hurricane Katrina, 
policymakers must make difficult decisions about how to rebuild storm defenses in New 
Orleans and along the Gulf Coast.  Increasing costs of protection and maintenance and 
evolving vulnerabilities due to climate change and human intervention in natural coastal 
systems have exacerbated hazards in southern Louisiana.  These tendencies combined 
with historical social and economic inequality and a lack of political will to address 
vulnerabilities contributed to the Katrina disaster.  In the wake of the storm, 
comprehensive coastal protection plans for Louisiana and Mississippi have been 
proposed and are in the vetting process at this time.  The plans propose multiple lines of 
defense that include shoring up man-made flood defenses and restoring natural defenses 
in the region.  But, how do the affected parties, both at the local and national level, value 
investments in public goods designed to reduce vulnerabilities along the Gulf Coast? Employing choice experiments via a random digit dialing telephone survey, we 
produce estimates of economic value for public projects that reduce risk from severe 
storms.  Our experiment offers improvements in levee flood protection, coastal 
restoration, and improvements in transportation infrastructure.  Each alternative 
improvement scenario is associated with higher one-time payment of federal taxes for all 
U.S. households.  These improvements are valued in pair wise comparisons with status 
quo conditions, and thus our estimates represent marginal willingness-to-pay for risk-
reducing projects.  Each subject evaluates four pair wise choice sets of the total 16 choice 
sets, which were designed using efficient algorithms for linear models.  The choice 
experiment was implemented as a referendum with majority rules provision, and subjects 
were instructed to treat each choice as independent of other choices. 
In general, respondents find traditional engineered flood protection structures to 
be the most salient and valued line of defense.  The local and national sentiment indicates 
that improved levee protection is a valuable public investment.  Coastal restoration 
garners some support but not to the degree that built flood protection systems received.  
Lastly, improved transportation systems are supported but not as strongly as levee 
improvement and coastal restoration.  Results of the repeated mixed logit model indicate 
that households in the New Orleans metro area are willing to pay $301 per household for 
category 5 levee protection and $137 per household to modernize the New Orleans 
metropolitan transportation system.   In addition to households’ values for Category 5 
levee protection, which primarily reflects a form of hazard mitigation, benefits from 
modernized transportation also represent an improvement to quality of life via better day-
to-day transportation options.  Estimates of value for coastal restoration for New Orleans resident are not statistically significant.    Aggregating over all New Orleans tax-paying 
households, estimated economic value for Category 5 flood protection is approximately 
$118 million ( 95% confidence interval: $54 million – $181 million).
8   The aggregate 
economic value of modernized transportation infrastructure for tax-paying New Orleans 
households is $54 million (90% confidence interval: $7 million – $100 million).  
We also present results for a sample of U.S. households that were offered the 
opportunity to vote in the same choice experiment.  Surprisingly, U.S. residents are 
willing to pay $509 per household for Category 5 levees in New Orleans.  This mean 
estimated economic value exceeds New Orleans residents’ mean MWTP by 69 percent.  
Comparing opinions on flood protection, 84 percent of U.S. respondents feel it is ‘very 
important’ to protect New Orleans from floods, compared to 98 percent of New Orleans 
residents.  Thus, this economic value could reflect a true preference for flood protection 
in this vulnerable and culturally distinct location.  The difference could reflect a higher 
income for the U.S. population relative to New Orleans residents, assuming flood 
protection is a normal good.   
Accounting for preference heterogeneity via the repeated mixed logit model, we 
do not find a statistically significant economic value for U.S. households that can be 
attributed to coastal restoration in South Louisiana.  Further investigation, however, 
utilizing the latent class model allows us to endogenously divide the U.S. sample into two 
distinct groups based on observable factors.  The first group is more likely to include 
lower income households that do not view coastal wetland restoration as important, while 
the second group is characterized by those with higher incomes and who place greater 
                                                 
8 According to the 2005-2007 American Community Survey 3-Year Estimates, there are 392,659 
households in the New Orleans MSA. importance on coastal restoration.  Willingness to pay for coastal restoration for the first 
group is not significantly different from zero, but the average individual in the second 
group is willing to pay $214 for coastal restoration.  Members of the first group may be 
less familiar with coastal wetlands, in general, and unaware of the storm protection 
provided by coastal marshes.  Fifty-two percent of U.S. respondents consider coastal 
restoration as ‘very important’, considerably less than the 86 percent of New Orleans 
residents that express this view.  Using posterior probabilities, we estimate that the 
average likelihood of individuals in our sample belonging to the first group is around 
35%.   
Lastly, with the repeated mixed logit model, U.S. respondents’ willingness-to-pay 
for improvements in transportation infrastructure is not statistically significant; again, the 
LC model reveals different results.  While we did not find a significant result for group 1, 
parameters for the second U.S. group exhibited a negative and statistically significant 
willingness-to-pay for modernized transportation.  This result may indicate that these 
types of individuals disapprove of development in high risk areas and do not want to 
create an incentive for expanded redevelopment in the form of modernized transportation.  
Public services, such as utilities and public transportation, act as de facto land use policy 
since they provide access to more locations.  This, in effect, can create incentives for 
development because a larger proportion of the population can access more remote areas. 
Without modern transportation, people may be dissuaded from developing in remote or 
high risk locations.   
  Combining the two samples and reweighting for representation at the national 
level and to correct for response bias based on observable factors, we produce tentative estimates of economic value for risk-reduction in New Orleans.  Under the assumption 
that this sample is a reasonable approximation of national preferences, the average U.S. 
household is willing to pay $449 for upgrading New Orleans levee system to withstand a 
Category 5 storm, and the average WTP for coastal restoration is $103 per household.  
The average U.S. household is WTP $103 for modernized transportation.  Aggregating 
over all U.S. tax-paying households, economic values for rebuilding New Orleans are: 
approximately $50 billion (95% confidence interval: $29 billion – $71 billion) for 
Category 5 flood protection in New Orleans, $12 billion (95% confidence interval: $2 
billion – $21 billion) for coastal restoration, and $12 billion (90% confidence interval: 
$0.3 billion –  $21 billion) for modernized transportation.
9  These estimates could 
provide valuable information for policymakers as they analyze risk-reducing projects fo
New Orleans and southern Louisi
r 
ana. 
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 Table 1: Choice Experiment Design 
Attribute Levels 
Levee Protection  Category Three Storm (status quo) 
Category Five Storm 
Coastal Restoration  No (status quo) 
Yes 
Transportation System  Conventional (status quo) 
Modernized 
One-time Tax Payment 
For all U.S. Households 





Each choice set was a pair wise comparison, with the status quo at zero additional tax 
offered against an alternative with at least one improvement and a higher tax. 
 Table 2:  Descriptive Statistics by Strata.   
  
   NOLA 
(Unweighted) 
NOLA 




   Obs Mean  Mean Obs Mean  Mean 
Female 119  0.7395 0.5788  215  0.5860 0.4954 
      0.4408 0.4958     0.4937 0.5011 
White 116  0.7155 0.6154  214  0.7617 0.7657 
      0.4531 0.4886     0.4271 0.4246 
African American  116  0.2500 0.3725  214  0.1822 0.1518 
      0.4349 0.4856     0.3869 0.3597 
No High School  117  0.0684 0.1433  216  0.0509 0.0920 
      0.2535 0.3519     0.2204 0.2896 
College Degree  117  0.3419 0.0983  216  0.3426 0.2721 
      0.4764 0.2989     0.4757 0.4461 
Married 119  0.5630 0.4933  212  0.5236 0.5472 
      0.4981 0.5021     0.5006 0.4989 
Income (< 15K)  116  0.2500 0.2111  122  0.2295 0.1996 
      0.4349 0.4099     0.4223 0.4014 
Income ( 15,001 - 30K)  116  0.3621 0.1878  122  0.3443 0.2250 
      0.4827 0.3922     0.4771 0.4193 
Income (> 100,000)  116  0.0776 0.1534  122  0.0246 0.0793 
      0.2687 0.3619     0.1555 0.2714 
This table represents the weighted and unweighted descriptive statistics for the NOLA and 
US strata.  In each case, mean values are in bold and standard deviations are directly below 
the mean values. 
 
 Table 3:  Importance of Flood Protection.   
Importance of   US Sample     NOLA Sample 
Flood Protection  Frequency  Percent  Frequency  Percent 
Not Important  7.08860838 2.64  0  0 
Somewhat Important  35.2500004 13.12  2.04462688  1.55 
Very Important  224.599351 83.62  128.582775 97.69 
N/A  1.64643997 0.61  1 0.76 
This table reports weighted frequencies to correct for non-response. 
 
Table 4:  Importance of Coastal Wetland Restoration.   
Importance of   US Sample     NOLA Sample 
Coastal Wetland Restoration  Frequency  Percent  Frequency  Percent 
Not Important  34.5087342 12.85  5.36724436  4.08 
Somewhat Important  94.3255745 35.12  2.13093932  9.22 
Very Important  139.750091 52.03  113.129218 85.95 
N/A  0 0  1  0.76 




Table 5:  Importance of Improved Transportation.   
Importance of   US Sample     NOLA Sample 
Improved Transportation  Frequency  Percent  Frequency  Percent 
Not Important  10.8639112 4.04  4.76848871 3.62 
Somewhat Important  109.77255 40.87  36.0447788 27.38 
Very Important  145.81486 54.29  89.8141345 68.23 
N/A  2.13307869 0.79  1 0.76 




 Table 6:  Repeated Mixed Logit Models 
   New Orleans  U.S.  Combined 
      
ASC1  0.5324 0.3663  0.7076 
   (0.3989) (0.4026)  (0.4028) 
Category 5  1.3801*** 3.4436***  2.9463*** 
   (0.2957) (0.6981)  (0.5836) 
Cat 5 Std Dev   -  3.3284***  2.0667*** 
    -  (0.7477)  (0.6571) 
Coastal Restoration  0.5177* 0.5845  0.6755 
   (0.3088) (0.3682)  (0.4562) 
CR Std Dev  1.6057*** 2.4609***  2.6503*** 
   (0.5096) (0.6770)  (0.7274) 
Modern Transportation  0.6295** 0.5507  0.6778* 
   (0.2766) (0.3420)  (0.3495) 
MT Std Dev   -  1.5446***  1.3564* 
    -  (0.6650)  (0.7155) 
Tax  -0.0046*** -0.0068***  -0.0066*** 
   (0.0007) (0.0014)  (0.0014) 
Individuals  120 217  336 
Observations  480 868 1347 
Null lnL  -497.355 -765.094  -1775.89 
lnL  -345.7521 -465.5882  -1523.98 
Halton Draws  1000 1000  1000 
Standard errors are in parentheses.  Mixing distribution assume normality. *** 
indicates statistical significance for 1 percent chance of type I error; ** indicates 












































      
   Group 1  Group 2 
ASC1  1.441** -0.0736 
   (0.623) (..1541) 
Category 5  3.799*** 1.014*** 
   (1.176) (0.111) 
Coastal Restoration  -0.220 0.421*** 
   (0.873) (0.138) 
Modern 
Transportation  0.990** -0.184** 
   (0..461) (0.075) 
Tax  -0.0088*** -0.002*** 
   (0.0022)  (0.0004) 
Class Probability Parameters    
Constant  4.881*** 0 
   (1.176)    
Coastal Wetland  -32.558*** 0 
Importance  (3.266)    
Income  -0.057*** 0 














Standard errors are in parentheses.  *** indicates statistical  
significance for 1 percent chance of type I error;  
** indicates statistical significance at 5 percent, and  
* indicates statistical significance at10 percent.Table 8: Welfare Measures (marginal willingness-to-pay) 
 
     
Repeated Mixed Logit 
Models     Latent Class Models 
  Combined  US  NOLA  US Sample  US Sample 
   Sample  Sample  Sample  Group 1  Group 2 
Category 5  $448.75   $509.16   $300.87   $432.56   $514.39  
95% CI  ($263.16, $634.34)  ($329.53, $688.79) ($138.54,  $463.20)  ($269.12, $596.00)  ($291.69, $737.09) 
90% CI  ($292.98, $604.52)  ($358.40, $659.92) ($164.63,  $437.11)  ($295.38, $596.74)  ($327.49, $701.29) 
Coastal 
Restoration $102.88    $86.43   $112.86   -$25.05  $213.59  
95% CI  ($18.69, $187.16)  (-$30.31, $203.17)  (-$28.26, $253.98) (-$266.99,  $216.89)  ($0.78, $426.47) 
90% CI  ($32.15, $173.62)  (-$11.55, $184.41)  (-$5.58, $231.30) (-$228.11,  $178.01) ($34.93, $392.25) 
Modernized 
Transportation $103.24    $81.42   $137.23   $112.77   -$93.45 
95% CI  (-$16.36, $222.84)  (-$26.83, $189.67)  (-$4.22, $278.68) (-$52.91,  $278.45) (-$181.57, -$5.33) 
90% CI  ($2.86, $203.62)  (-$9.43, $172.27)  ($18.51, $255.95)  (-$26.28, $251.82)  (-$167.41, -$19.49) 


















































 Appendix:  
A: Cheap Talk Script 
 
We would now like to ask you about four rebuilding plans for New Orleans.  The plans 
differ in the types of improvements that are made to the city and the cost to taxpayers.  
Suppose that each of the plans are put up for a vote, you may vote for or against each 
plan or choose not to vote—majority rules.   
 
Before we get to the vote, consider the following information.  In a recent study, groups 
of people participated in a vote just like the one you are about to participate in.  The 
improvements and costs of the plan for these groups were not real, just as they will not be 
real for you.  No one had to pay money if the vote passed, and most voted for the plan.   
 
Other groups of similar people participated in the same vote, but payment was real and 
everyone really did have to pay the cost if the vote passed.  In these groups most voted 
against the plan.  We call this difference between the way people say they would vote 
and the way they really vote “bias.” 
 
Sometimes when we hear about a vote that involves doing something that is basically 
good—helping people in need, improving air and water quality, or anything else—our 
reaction in a hypothetical situation is to think: sure, I would do this.  I really would vote 
to spend the money. 
 
But when the vote is real, and we would actually have to spend our money if it passes, we 
think a different way.  We still would like to see good things happen, but when we are 
faced with having to spend money, we think about our options; if I spend money on this, 
that’s money I don’t have to spend on other things.  We vote in a way that takes into 
account the limited amount of money we have.   
 
I would like for you to think about your votes just like you would think about a real vote, 
where if enough people vote for the plan, you’d really have to pay and so would everyone 
else.  Please keep this in mind as you answer the four voting questions. 
  
For the purpose of these questions, the current rebuilding plan for New Orleans will be: 
-  Limited bus service (routes, transfer points, and hours of service buses), 
limited use of street cars, and conventional road network 
-  No restoration program for Louisiana’s coastal wetlands 
-  Repair the levee system to withstand a Category 3 hurricane 
-  You pay $0 in additional tax money for one year 
 
We will now give you the opportunity to vote on four separate plans for rebuilding.  Each 
of the four plans differs in the type of improvements that are made and the associated 
costs.  Money to fund the plan would come from a one-time tax on all US households.  
The tax amount differs due to the nature of the rebuilding plan and because we are 
uncertain about what the actual costs would be. Assume that all money raised would go 
directly to rebuilding New Orleans. Please consider each plan separately in relation to the current plan, and indicate whether 
or not you would vote for this plan if the vote were real. 
 
B: Choice Experiment 
 
Remember, the current plan is (i) limited bus service, street cars, and conventional roads 
(ii) no restoration of coastal wetlands, (iii) repair the levees to withstand a Category 3 
hurricane, and (iv) no additional taxes. 
 
B: Example of Conjoint Choice Set (immediately following above survey text) 
 
Alternatives: 
Block Set  Transportation    Coastal restoration  Levee    Tax 
1  1  Conventional   YES    Category  3  $300 
       
1  2  Modern  NO    Category  3  $450 
       
1  3  Conventional   NO    Category  5  $50 
       




1.  Transportation and the levees would be the same as the current plan. This alternative 
plan proposes to restore coastal wetlands.  This plan would cost each US household 
an extra $300. Would you vote for the current plan or this new plan? 
 
2.  The levees and the coastal wetlands would be the same as the current plan but the 
new plan would include improvements in the transportation system. This plan would 
cost each US household an extra $450. Would you vote for the current plan or this 
new plan? 
 
3.  The transportation and the coastal wetland restoration would be the same as the 
current plan but the new plan would include improvements in the levees to protect the 
city against a Category 5 hurricane.  This plan would cost each US household an 
extra $50. Would you vote for the current plan or this new plan? 
 
4.  In this plan, the transportation system would be improved, the coastal wetlands 
restored and the levees improved to protect the City against a Category 5 hurricane.  
This plan would cost each US household an extra $150. Would you vote for the 
current plan or this new plan? 
 